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THE GROUP AND WHAT HAPPENS ON THE WAY TO "YES"
Deborah G. Ancona, Ray Friedman, Deborah M. Kolb
While the negotiation archetype is of two individuals
haggling with each other, more typically negotiation takes place
within and between groups. In labor relations, union and
management bargainers meet in committees; in community disputes
(e.g., the citing of a waste disposal facility), groups of
government officials, neighborhood residents, and environmental
advocates face each other; and in international diplomacy,
political leaders, diplomats, military and economic advisors, and
others are commonly involved. Since negotiation takes place in
groups, group dynamics play an important part in how bargainers
come to agreement.
Curiously, analysts have only rarely considered group
phenomena as an integral part of negotiation theory in either the
descriptive or prescriptive literature (for exceptions, see
Pruitt, 1977). A substantial body of work delineates both win-
lose and win-win strategies and tactics that individual
negotiators can pursue (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Pruitt, 1980;
Fisher and Ury, 1981). Others researchers focus on the
individual cognitive limitations and barriers that can impede a
negotiator's ability to achieve beneficial outcomes (Raiffa,
1982; Bazerman and Neale, 1983; Lax and Sebenius, 1986).
Finally, there is considerable work documenting the interactive
dynamics of competition, cooperation, and the perils of
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escalating conflict (Deutsch, 1973; Axelrod, 1984; Pruitt and
Rubin, 1986).
The neglect of group dynamics is particularly problematic
since new bargaining models encourage a problem-solving process
that differs significantly from more traditional, linear
concessionary models.' Studies of group process and dynamics
over the past several decades have shown that, when individuals
join groups, the collective activity is different than the sum of
Lts individual parts; in addition, groups have their own dynamics
that arise from the collective enterprise, and these can support
or detract from a problem-solving process in negotiated contexts.
Our purpose is to draw from scholarship on group dynamics,
particularly recent work on task forces and new product teams,
and explore the implications for mutual-gains bargaining. To
clarify our argument and to allow greater specificity, we will
examine one particular bargaining situation: contract
negotiations between labor and management. A similar analysis
could be done for other negotiating contexts.
Groups in Traditional and Mutual-Gains Barqaininq
A group is a collection of individuals who interact, who are
1 This new approach to negotiations is sometimes referred to
as principled or interest-based negotiations (Fisher and Ury,
1981); integrative bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Pruitt,
1980) or mutual-gains bargaining (Raiffa, 19883; Lax and
Sebenius, 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). While these
labels have slightly different meanings, the core of the
processes are similar. We use these terms interchangeably to
refer to a form of negotiation in which parties focus on
interests, look for ways to expand resources, and focus on




interdependent at least to some degree, and who influence or can
be influenced by each other (Cartwright and Zander, 1968; Shaw,
1981). In most negotiations, there are three sets of group
relations.
First, each side is usually represented by a bargaining
team. Each team is charged to negotiate an agreement acceptable
to its respective constituency. We will label these groups the
primary negotiating teams. Each primary negotiating team needs
to develop a group identity and a set of norms that will allow it
to coalesce effectively. It needs to develop internal mechanisms
for structuring work and for making decisions. In labor
negotiations, labor and management each has a primary team.
While the primary teams need to coordinate internally, they
also need to coordinate with the other primary team: they need to
work with the opponent. We label this larger group, which
includes primary negotiating teams from both sides, the
integrating team. In most negotiations, including labor
negotiations, the primary teams function at arm's-length most of
the time and only occasionally cohere into an integrated group.
Finally, each primary team (and the integrated team) has a
relationship it must manage with its "second table," the
constituents who have ultimate authority over the terms of an
agreement. The exact nature of that authority varies a great
deal. In traditional collective bargaining, the authority
relationship between management-primary teams and their
constituent groups is based primarily on hierarchy, while the
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authority relationship between union-primary teams and their
constituents is based primarily on politics. These arrangements
affect the ways in which constituent groups are involved and
consulted.
Mutual-gains bargaining (MGB) introduces into this pattern
of relations a new set of ideas and processes. MGB suggests a
focus on interests and not positions, on inventing options for
mutual gain rather than haggling over a fixed amount of
resources, and on judging these options according to objective
criteria instead of relying heavily on bargaining power to
influence outcomes. In other words, negotiators are urged to
engage in a process of joint problem solving in order to fashion
agreements that maximize gains for both parties.
Normative models of mutual-gains bargaining describe a set
of steps for carrying out this type of negotiation. Typically,
parties are advised to establish an agenda that begins with
mutual sharing of interests, followed by collective
"brainstorming" to identify creative ways of satisfying these
interests and of establishing criteria by which possible ideas
can be evaluated. This process is intended to result in
agreements that meet the interests of the various parties (Fisher
and Ury, 1981; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987).
But MGB does not just introduce new concepts and steps; it
creates and depends on a pattern of group dynamics that is
different from traditional bargaining. In order for MGB to be
successful group norms within primary teams must change to allow
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for broader participation. In addition, the integrated team must
develop dynamics which are less cautious, become a place where
interests are shared, and become more prominent in comparison to
the primary team. This change, in turn, has an impact on how
primary teams work. And, as more new ideas are generated, the
nature and intensity of relations between primary teams and
constituent groups need to be changed; the teams are under
increased pressure to bring their constituents along in a process
that is really being designed as it occurs.
The elements of the MGB process, while well defined in
theory, provide little guidance once the parties actually begin
negotiating. It is at this point that individual bargainers move
into a group context, within their own team and across the table,
and that the group dynamics can contribute to--or detract from--
the problem solving. From a group perspective, the model should
address the following:
(1) the underlying individual and organizing dynamics that mark
the early phases of group activity, specifically the development
of group norms, that impact how the group does its work
(Bettinghausen and Murnighan, 1985; Schein, 1988);
(2) the importance of the middle stages of a group's life as an
occasion for change in its normative and task structure (Gersick,
1989); and
(3) the tension between developing the internal processes of the
team and managing the relationships between external groups that
will influence the group's product (Ancona, 1990).
MGB differs significantly from traditional collective
bargaining in terms of the demands it makes on the relationships
within the primary negotiating teams, the integrated team, and
constituent groups. We will explore these differences in the
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context of these three group perspectives. We will use data from
ongoing field experiments in mutual-gains bargaining to describe
the ways these issues manifest themselves and the dilemmas they
create. Finally, drawing from the study of groups in others
contexts, we will suggest ways in which principles of group
process may be used to resolve these dilemmas.
Data and Methodology
The data used in this analysis is drawn from observations of
three negotiations that took place in the United States in the
late 1980's, (the names have been changed to preserve
confidentiality). In each case, negotiators attempted to
implement mutual-gains bargaining. We will not try to present a
comprehensive analysis of these cases; instead we will draw from
them to illustrate the ways in which group dynamics in
negotiations affect, and are affected by, a mutual-gains approach
to bargaining.
In the first case, which we will call Northwest, Inc.,
mutual-gains bargaining was effectively implemented, albeit in
the face of great resistance from some constituents, and an
agreement was reached by the appointed deadline. Mutual-gains
bargaining was initiated after extensive meetings between
constituents months before negotiations began, training included
one phase attended by constituents and another for negotiators
alone, and most of the negotiators supported mutual-gains
bargaining. The actual negotiations, as in the other cases,
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lasted for several months. There was a great deal of open
discussion during negotiations, as well as plenty of frustration
and conflict. Most people on both sides strongly supported the
final agreement and the MGB process. We observed this
negotiation from beginning to end.
In the second case, Southwest, Inc., the mutual-gains
approach worked well during the first half of negotiations, but
was effectively abandoned halfway through. In the end, the
parties reached an impasse, and the union struck for three weeks.
The mutual-gains process at Southwest was initiated over a year
before actual negotiations, and included three separate training
sessions. The first included negotiators and constituents; the
others were for negotiators only. Both during training and in
negotiations many constituents were ambivalent about the MGB
process. A major influence in these negotiations was resistance
from the company's corporate headquarters, and from the union's
national leadership. In this case, we observed the training, and
interviewed the negotiators during and after negotiations.
In the third case, Eastern, Inc., MGB was not effectively
implemented at any time during negotiations. Instead, the
negotiators reverted to traditional negotiations almost
immediately. However, the effort did take some of the "edge"
from the negotiations, and the parties did reach an agreement and
did feel that the relationships had not been damaged by
negotiations. Training for this company began several months
before negotiations, but it did not include constituents, and
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there was great controversy within the union about attending the
training. In the last week before negotiations began, a new
person was assigned to lead negotiations for the union. We were
able to observe most of these negotiations from beginning to end.
In all three cases, the training occurred at off-site
meetings. It included general presentations of the core ideas of
MGB, negotiating simulations designed to illustrate those ideas,
and, for the actual negotiators, an all-day bargaining simulation
that gave people a chance to practice the MGB ideas that they
were learning. The training also included explicit discussions
about the merits of MGB compared with traditional negotiations,
and some actual negotiations over the process they would use to
negotiate.
Getting the Group Started: Norm Development in Groups
For primary teams, integrated teams, and constituents, as
for other kinds of groups, getting started is a particularly
difficult yet influential part of a group's evolution. Team
members are often anxious about how they will fit in and
establish themselves in this new social arena. Norms, or
expectations about how members should behave, are formed early
(sometimes in the first few minutes of the first meeting), and
set the stage for future interaction. For example, if the leader
sets the agenda, leads the meetings and criticizes anyone who
disagrees with her, then the group members may soon learn to nod
their heads and follow her lead. Understanding this early stage
of a group's life is particularly important in mutual-gains
8
11
bargaining, where teams must embark on new ways of interacting.
Anxiety over group membership may begin even before formal
meetings commence. Members worry about their role in the group,
the control they will be able to exert, and whether they will be
accepted (Schein, 1988). These individual concerns constitute
the unconscious or emotional life of the group, which is often
ignored as the group sets out to work. Yet these concerns often
lead to behaviors vis a vis other group members that make getting
started difficult and that interfere with rational task
functioning (Bion, 1961, Rioch, 1975). Schein (1988) suggests
that these issues of identity, control, and acceptance must be
resolved before members can fully engage in the task of the
group.
Members are concerned with establishing "identity" in the
group. They need to figure out the roles they will play on the
team --- whether they will be outspoken or quiet, aggressive or
humorous, a leader or a follower. As members concentrate on
these issues and work through the possibilities, their ability to
listen and participate is often curtailed. Concerns about
authority and influence also affect behavior in the early stages
of a group. Members attend to the early dynamics in order to
determine who will be in a controlling position and who will be
influenced by others. As a result, early stages are often marked
by testing of oneself and others to see where authority and
influence lie. These periods may be marked by conflict among
members over seemingly inconsequential things. It is important
9
to understand, however, that these conflicts involve establishing
power and position as much as they involve disagreement over
substantive issues.
Finally, members are always concerned about whether their
individual goals will be congruent with those of the group, and
whether they will be accepted by the members. These concerns are
enacted during periods of high participation followed by those
marked with periods of a quiet "wait and see" attitude, as
members test to see how their input is received. Here again,
group progress may follow the rhythms of member comfort rather
than task work.
Individual concerns are often ignored as the team meets and
begins to carry out its task. Previous research has shown that
teams develop norms about their work, interpersonal relations,
and relations with the host organization quickly, sometimes
within the first few minutes of their first meeting (Ancona,
1980; Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985; Gersick, 1988). These
norms evolve from a combination of individual member experience
and that which the group develops as a whole. Team members bring
familiar scripts from other group experiences to a new group
situation, and these scripts give members a sequence of activity
to follow in new and uncertain situations (Abelson, 1976; Taylor,
Crocker, D'Agostino, 1978). In other words, a group's process is
never a tabula rasa; its foundation is built on the existing
scripts of the group members.
Early anxiety to make some progress pushes team members to
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follow existing scripts and to begin work quickly by assigning
roles and responsibilities. This "solution mindedness" (Hoffman
and Maier, 1964) pushes members toward solutions without fully
considering whether their assumptions are shared or accurate,
what the assumptions are, and whether the structure they create
will lead to the outcomes they seek.
While such progress is often comforting to the group, early
norm development can be problematic over the long haul. Hackman,
Brousseau, and Weiss (1975) show that for new or complex tasks,
such as mutual-gains bargaining, previous modes of operating are
often not congruent with the new task. They suggest that, before
automatically following implicit patterns, members explicitly
discuss "performance strategies," that is, how they will work
together. Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1985) illustrate another
problem with early, untested norm formation. In their zest to
move the team along, members often ignore or don't realize that
members bring different scripts and assumptions to the table.
Thus, while task progress may be made quickly under an assumed
consensus, conflict is often just postponed until the differing
assumptions become clear. When this happens, it forces the group
to backtrack and openly negotiate about the norms under which
they will operate.
Individual adjustment to the group and norm formation occur
not only in formal group meetings, but in other arenas as well.
Informal dinners and parties, subgroup meetings, and one-on-one
communications are all arenas in which identity, control, and
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acceptance issues are worked out and expectations and work rules
are set. Such activities may be designed to facilitate this
early development process. However, norm formation is not solely
a function of implicit scripts and explicit planning. Key events
in the group's life can shape the rules by which the group
functions. For example, a team that is penalized by top
management for leaking key information is likely to develop
strict norms about secrecy. Thus, a team's early formation
process involves individual experiences, group meetings, informal
contacts, and key events. All are important to the development
of group norms that support mutual gains bargaining.
Getting Started in Traditional Labor Negotiations. All
groups experience a great deal of anxiety in the first meeting
about what norms of behavior and social order will emerge. In
traditional labor negotiations, this concern is heightened by the
high stakes involved in the bargaining and because, for many team
members, bargaining is not part of a regular job. Collective
bargaining is carried out, therefore, in a highly charged
atmosphere marked by pressure, uncertainty and complexity.
In traditional negotiations, some clarity is provided by the
existence of broadly understood scripts for negotiating which are
reinforced by leaders and individuals who have been through
negotiations before (Friedman, 1989). Elements of the
established script include: each side begins with a laundry list
of demands, then lets some issues "fall off the table" at the
appropriate time; chief negotiators are aggressive at the public
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bargaining table and more conciliatory and open in private
"sidebar meetings;" chief negotiators exert control over their
primary groups in order to channel communication across the
table. These norms help people know how to act, what to say, and
what to expect. Further, traditional patterns of behavior are
strategically important in that they help to keep negotiators'
goals, constraints, and desires hidden from the other side, while
impressing constituents with the negotiators' strength and
fervor. If these norms were not taught by old hands, they would
be invented anew.
Supporting these norms is a social order that structures
relationships within and between groups in negotiations (Friedman
and Gal, 1990). There is strict hierarchical control within the
primary team, and opposition between primary teams (the
integrated team is not legitimate); members of the primary team
are agents representing (and under the control of) constituents.
This social order maintains the control over information and
impressions that is the core of traditional bargaining. It also
provides a clear notion of who is in control, who sets the norms,
and whom to trust.
Getting started in mutual gains bargaining. In mutual gains
bargaining, the development of norms is complicated for two
reasons. First, the desired norms of interaction are different.
Members of the integrated team need to reveal and explain their
underlying interests and discuss options for addressing those
interests. Second, existing scripts and power structures based
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on traditional norms will drive behavior unless there are
explicit efforts to shape norms in an alternative direction.
This tendency results from lack of experience with a new process
and the need to reduce ambiguity; negotiators return to familiar
and comfortable scripts.
In order for mutual-gains bargaining to work, a new set of
norms needs to emerge and emerge early. It is in the earliest
stages of bargaining that the negotiations path is determined.
This is when groups struggle not only with the concepts of
mutual-gains bargaining but also over its implications for their
own behavior and control needs. These struggles occur during
training and continue into the early stages of bargaining. The
norms, whether they support mutual-gains bargaining or not,
emerge from these dynamics.
Joint training is a common method of introducing labor and
management to mutual-gains bargaining. It brings them together
off-site to learn the principles of mutual-gains bargaining, to
discuss how they will negotiate, and to practice by using
bargaining simulations (often switching roles). It is a time
when members learn new skills, obviously, but training is also
the first time the differences between the traditional and the
mutual-gains bargaining scripts are played out. Thus as the
groups go through training, they confront issues of dominance,
control, and habit, and they develop --- either implicitly or
explicitly --- the guidelines that will mark their negotiations.
During training, negotiators first understand the
14
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implications that mutual-gains bargaining has for their power and
control. At Southwest, Inc., for example, one lead negotiator
was worried when he realized that mutual-gains bargaining
involved direct participation by all members of the bargaining
team. In response, he developed careful instructions for his
team, detailing precisely what they could do or say during the
simulations. He was worried not only that negotiators would
subtly "give away" the company's positions, but also that members
of his team would get used to acting independently. Concerned
about the upcoming negotiations, he was reluctant to allow
control to be diffused. Throughout the simulations and
subsequent negotiations, when this negotiator was present,
members of his team continued to defer to him and so limited
their own contributions.
There is also a tendency in these early training sessions to
reproduce old patterns. "Old hands," people who have been
through bargaining before, may inadvertently "train" newcomers in
the traditional approach. During the initial moments of the
bargaining simulation at Northwest, Inc., for example, the
union's most experienced negotiator explained the procedure to
newcomers: if they wanted to have an idea conveyed, they should
send a note to her. Some of the newcomers argued, based on the
training, that this was inconsistent with mutual gains
bargaining. In contrast with the situation at Southwest, this
explicit discussion about process helped set the norm of open
participation that continued well into the bargaining.
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More generally, training allows both the primary teams and
the integrated teams to discuss consciously what norms should be
established for negotiations. During the training, they have the
opportunity to explain why the traditional process made sense,
express fears about the new process, and negotiate over the very
process of negotiating. At both Northwest and Southwest,
negotiators left the training program with a list of rules that
they believed would govern negotiations.
The training phase is also critical because impressions made
and formed there can last throughout negotiations. At Northwest,
for example, two simulations were run concurrently (each had
negotiators from both sides). One group fell into old patterns
of negotiating, while the other used the mutual-gains bargaining
approach quite well. During the debriefing, everyone learned
which group had "failed" and which had "succeeded." Over the
next months, individuals from the first group would occasionally
be reminded, jokingly, that they were from the "remedial group."
When negotiations actually begin, group norms are still
being formed. Because lines of authority are challenged by the
mutual-gains bargaining training, people are still not sure how
to act: no one quite knows how to start, and there are many long,
awkward pauses. People ask each other: can we disagree, or do we
have to be "nice"? Can everyone talk? Will we have caucuses?
Indeed, some of the first conflicts were over the mutual-gains
bargaining process itself. At Northwest, for example, one side
was convinced that mutual-gains bargaining meant meeting together
16
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all the time so that everyone could share ideas. The other side
was equally sure that mutual-gains bargaining meant meeting in
subcommittee so that members could develop individual areas of
expertise and the integrated group would not have to depend on
outside staff support. This was a confusing time for the
integrated team; each side dealt with the confusion by accusing
the other of not doing mutual-gains bargaining "right." Further,
at the individual level, negotiators at Northwest corrected each
other when any clearly understood aspect of mutual-gains
bargaining was violated (e.g., referring to an "interest" as a
"position"). Some even corrected themselves, stopping and
apologizing when they recognized that they had made an
inappropriate statement.
At Eastern, Inc., mutual gains bargaining was essentially
abandoned during this early stage . The lead union negotiator,
who had not attended the training program, insisted on
maintaining the traditional process with which he was familiar.
He established a pattern on the first days of negotiations that
stuck for the rest of the meetings. At the first meeting, the
negotiators who had been through joint training hesitated to sit
down, not knowing if they should be interspersed with the other
side or with their team. The lead union negotiator settled the
issue by seating himself in the middle chair of one side of the
table, instructing his team to sit next to him. At this point,
the two primary teams sat facing each other across the table in
traditional fashion, a signal that the lead negotiator was in
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control of his team and that the two sides would not be working
together. This pattern persisted throughout the negotiations.
Establishing norms that support mutual gains bargaining may
depend on a factor as simple as relabeling the steps in the
negotiating process. At Southwest, for example, negotiators
called the initial meetings "pre-bargaining" sessions so that
they would not preclude using traditional bargaining later. At
Northwest the initial phases were also labeled "pre-
negotiations," in order to align actual bargaining with the steps
outlined in training. This labeling led to the question that
some negotiators asked each other later in negotiations: "Are we
'negotiating' yet?"
In the three cases, relationships stabilized in different
ways. Negotiators at Northwest and Southwest eventually settled
into a pattern of open discussion as an integrated team. At
Northwest the integrated team included all negotiators, while at
Southwest there were several integrated teams operating in
specialized subcommittees. At Eastern, the traditional approach
prevailed.
The Midpoint in a Group's Life
Collective bargaining passes through decision-making stages
where parties establish a bargaining range, explore it, and
ultimately make decisions about settlement (Douglas, 1962:
Gulliver, 1978). Studies of groups operating on a variety of
tasks with set time limits suggest that the midpoint in a group's
existence is a second critical juncture. It is at this point
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that groups engaged in negotiations have the opportunity to shift
their work patterns.
Gersick (1988, 1989) provides some understanding of the
midpoint's pivotal role. In contexts as diverse as student
projects and task forces at a bank and a hospital, she found that
teams develop basic approaches to work, to relationships among
members, and to their environment early, often during the first
meeting. These early patterns dominate team functioning until
the midpoint, which serves as a time to reevaluate the group's
efforts. Team members often realize that progress has not been
as fast as desired (or that the product does not look as if it
will meet the group's objectives), and that there is a limited
amount of time to get all the work done. While the first half of
a team's life is spent making incremental or evolutionary
changes, the midpoint can be a period of revolution. Group
members are suddenly open to assessing how well they have done
and what needs to be changed. If at first members were closed to
outside feedback, now they seek it out. If a team was
preoccupied with generating ideas, now they start evaluating
those ideas. During this time of reassessment, team members
reshape the way they approach their task, each other, and their
environment. Thus, during the early and midpoint stages of a
group, members are most open to suggestion and facilitation.
Following the midpoint revolution, teams go back to incremental
adjustments along the lines set by the midpoint change.
The concept of the midpoint revolution was "discovered" in a
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study of eight temporary task forces, that had explicit deadlines
(Gersick 1988). Many teams do not have similarly definitive time
lines. Yet even these teams have milestones and subtasks with
defined timeframes. So a team can go through this pattern of
evolutionary change punctuated by revolution during a particular
portion of its work or development.
Teams sometimes fail to carry out this midpoint change
because of their organizational contexts (Ancona 1990; Hackman,
1990). Teams often get labeled based on early indicators of
performance. Once a team is labeled as either a high-potential
or low-potential performer, that reputation becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy from which the team cannot escape. Even if
the team changes its mode of operation, the change may not be
acknowledged in the surrounding environment. Alternatively, the
revolution may be inhibited because group members feel
constrained by their reputation. As with early formation
processes, the midpoint and labeling phenomena can be managed to
facilitate mutual-gains bargaining.
The Midpoint in Traditional Negotiations. In traditional
bargaining, the first phase of negotiations is a "feeling out"
process: each side presents its demands, hears the other sides
problems and concerns, and works out some preliminary agreement
on nonfinancial issues. However, negotiations often do not get
"serious" until many weeks later. There has been no research
explicitly on the midpoint in negotiations, but the notion that
at some point the style, tone, and topic of negotiations go
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through a major shift conforms to observations of traditional
bargaining (Douglas, 1962). This switch tends to mark the point
when the "show" ends and "real bargaining" begins. At this point
many of the trivial issues quickly "fall off the table," the lead
bargainers tighten control over negotiations, more happens in
sidebar discussions, financial elements of the contract become
more prominent, and each side begins to seriously assess the
impact of a strike.
The Midpoint in mutual-gains bargaining. In mutual gains
bargaining as well, the midpoint seems to be a major point of
transition. As in traditional bargaining, deadlines become
salient and the volume of work seems daunting. Further, mutual-
gains bargaining adds its own pressures. There tend to be more
outstanding issues, more suspicion from constituent groups, and a
required shift in process from generating ideas to actually
deciding what the ultimate package will be. At this point many
of the problems experienced in the initial phases are
reintroduced. That is, there is confusion about what to do,
questions about authority, and debates about what is "right"
according to mutual-gains bargaining. Thus the midpoint
constitutes a significant point of risk.
In the two cases where mutual-gains bargaining was actually
used, the experiences were quite different. At Northwest, about
halfway through negotiations, bargainers began to worry about
whether they would be able to finish by the deadline. During the
first month of negotiations, norms supported discussing things
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openly, sharing ideas, and avoiding premature criticism of
options. But nothing had been decided. Because mutual-gains
bargaining was taken seriously, more issues were raised than
normal and more ideas (including radical ones) were generated;
and negotiators tried to judge these ideas using objective
criteria. All of these factors created more work for
negotiators, stretching their capacity to collect relevant data.
When negotiators began to realize this, panic set in.
At this point the issue that had dominated the first days of
negotiations reemerged: how do we do mutual-gains bargaining?
The negotiators agreed they had reached a different phase. While
they had learned how to discuss interests and generate options,
they had not yet experienced packaging and deciding. Each
primary team had different ideas on how to deal with this
problem.
In the face of this pressure, the integrated team at
Northwest asked the mutual-gains bargaining trainer for
assistance. He supported one side's proposal that they break up
into subcommittees that would specialize in different issues.
This would allow for more efficient use of time, and for the
development of expertise in certain areas (health insurance
provisions, for example, were difficult to master). At this
point, small groups worked intensively to eliminate unrealistic
options, decide on concrete numbers, and make relevant tradeoffs.
The midpoint shift was productive.
In contrast, at Southwest, the teams reverted to the
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traditional script at the midpoint. About halfway through
negotiations, "pre-bargaining" ended and "bargaining" began.
During pre-bargaining, integrated teams worked in subcommittees
exploring problems and generating options. Constituents and the
lead bargainers permitted this activity as long as "real
bargaining" was not occurring. But once actual decisions had to
be made, lead bargainers, under pressure from constituents,
retook control. "Real bargaining" occurred at the main table,
where the lead bargainers controlled what was said. As in
traditional approaches, much of the final bargaining was carried
out among the top negotiators in sidebar meetings. The
bargainers who had formed integrated teams in subcommittees felt
isolated and angry that the lead bargainers (who had not
participated in prebargaining and therefore did not gain
experience in the mutual-gains bargaining approach) took control
of negotiations.
At the midpoint the mutual-gains bargaining process can be
scuttled. If there were doubts about the process from the
beginning, they may come to the fore when negotiators realize
that time is running out. In addition, constituent groups and
others increase their monitoring of the integrated team's
activities and may pressure the team to behave in more accustomed
ways. Thus, mutual-gains bargaining is especially vulnerable at
the midpoint.
Ironically, however, teams following a traditional approach
may shift to using elements of mutual-gains bargaining at the
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midpoint (Putnam, forthcoming). In one case not in our study,
the union backed out of joint training in mutual-gains
bargaining, while management attended. Negotiators initially
used the traditional approach. In one subcommittee where
progress was stymied, a management negotiator suggested that they
try using some elements of mutual-gains bargaining. The
integrated team agreed and spent several days brainstorming for
innovative ways to solve a sales commission formula problem.
This process helped, but members of the integrated team agreed
that too little was done, too late. A switch to mutual-gains
bargaining can occur at the midpoint, but it is more likely that
external pressures, time constraints, and a focus on financial
issues will drive out mutual-gains bargaining at this point.
Balancinq Internal and External Group Processes
When parties engage in mutual gains bargaining, the
relationships between the primary, integrated, and constituent
groups is more complicated than they are in traditional
bargaining. Each team must manage not only its own internal
dynamics but also the interactions with the other groups.
Research on other types of teams (new product teams, consulting
teams, and top management teams) suggests that the management of
these external relationships is more predictive of performance
than is its internal dynamics (Ancona, 1990: Ancona and Caldwell,
1989; Pennings, 1980; Pfeffer, 1986).
Teams facing the same tasks within the same organizations
still make very different decisions about how to allocate time
24
_~__11_1____·_~___~·~__l~l__l~ly__j__ ~ ___ ---------------_
11
between internal and external activities. Groups use three major
strategies to define their initiatives toward outside groups
(Ancona, 1990). Informing teams remain relatively isolated from
their environment, prefer that members concentrate on internal
processes, use existing member knowledge to carry out their task,
and later inform other groups about what they have decided.
Parading teams have more interaction with other groups and top
management, but that interaction is passive -- they observe and
scan what these other groups are doing. In contrast, probing
teams actively engage outsiders in all phases of their work.
They continually gather information and revise their knowledge
through contact with others in the organization. Probing team
members also ask for feedback on their work, test out new ideas
with outsiders, and promote their team's achievements throughout
the organization.
For teams whose success depends on outsider support or
acceptance (such as the ratification requirement of collective
bargaining), a probing strategy seems to result in the highest
performance. Internally oriented informing teams are most likely
to fail because their work is insulated from critical
constituencies. They may develop an outstanding product or
process, but it will never be accepted or implemented because of
resistance among constituent groups. Probing teams, however, do
pay a price for their success. In the short term, members of
these teams experience confusion, unclear goals, and
dissatisfaction with the work of the group. Because these team
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members are actively engaged in trying to understand external
views, they bring diverse opinions and perspectives into the
team, which in turn exacerbates the conflict and confusion
attending any group effort. However, as teams learn to work with
this ambiguity and develop ways of dealing with conflict, they
eventually become the higher performers (Ancona, 1990).
Teams can use a probing strategy to handle interdependence
and coordination with other groups. For example, representatives
of these other groups can be invited to present their views. Or
a team can negotiate with other groups about the parameters
within which it will work and then remain within those limits. A
third alternative is to introduce a parallel structure whereby
other members of management and the union participate with the
integrated group in certain phases of training and negotiation.
Periodic sharing of ideas between the parallel groups may improve
the understanding and acceptance of the final products. A
probing strategy may be superfluous if top management sponsorship
is strong right from the start. Groups do not have to work on
gaining support since it is provided by the sponsor at pivotal
times and places.
Constituent Relations in Traditional Negotiations. In
traditional collective bargaining, relationships with
constituents, or "intra-organizational" bargaining, is always
problematic (Walton and McKersie, 1965). Adams (1976) describes
it as a "cycle of distrust": If negotiators get too close to
opponents, constituents become suspicious, monitor the
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negotiators, and thereby reduce their flexibility to act and
produce a good agreement. When the agreement is not what is
expected, this reinforces the distrust that began the monitoring.
Given the requirements for ratification, managing constituents is
a critical element in labor negotiations.
In traditional bargaining, constituent relations are often
managed with some drama --- public shows of anger that mask the
private, unobserved arenas of "real" negotiations. Constituents
may observe the shows directly or hear about them indirectly from
members of the bargaining team. Either way, constituent groups
need to be convinced that their representatives are working hard
on their behalf. Whatever private deals are reached must then be
"sold" to constituents as the best that could be achieved. This
is a careful blend of the isolated "informing" approach and the
more active "probing" approach. This pattern is not well suited
to mutual-gains bargaining.
Constituent Relations in mutual-gains bargaining. Constituent
relations seem to be more of a problem in mutual-gains
bargaining. Typically constituents are not centrally involved in
the decision to try mutual-gains bargaining. Their exposure to
the process is limited because they do not receive extensive
training; and, even if they were to participate more fully,
learning about mutual-gains bargaining comes more from the doing
than the training. Further, the process itself is likely to lead
to innovations and ideas that were not foreseen or pre-approved
by constituents. Finally, distrust builds as constituent groups
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see their representatives working together in an integrated
fashion. For these reasons, mutual-gains bargaining presents the
primary teams with significant environmental-management
challenges.
In all three cases, negotiators faced pressures from
constituents even before negotiations began. At Northwest,
constituents allowed negotiators to commit to training only after
they agreed to set an early deadline for negotiations so that, if
mutual-gains bargaining did not work, they would still have time
to negotiate in the traditional manner. At Southwest, initial
constituent worries were deflected when the negotiators said that
the mutual-gains bargaining approach would only be used during
"pre-bargaining." The group would then revert to traditional
bargaining when real negotiations began. In both cases,
negotiators had to convince constituents that traditional
bargaining was not precluded by trying mutual-gains bargaining.
When negotiations began, constituent expectations and
misunderstanding of mutual-gains bargaining continued to
constrain negotiators. Before the MGB approach was completely
scuttled at Eastern, union constituents insisted that their
demands be presented to management. The primary union team
understood that these demands were traditional "positions," not a
list of "interests" (the beginning point for mutual-gains
bargaining discussions), but they felt compelled to make the
presentation anyway. They tried to skirt the problem by
claiming, "We are just doing this for our members, then we can do
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mutual-gains bargaining." However, it was hard to develop a
mutual-gains bargaining approach once the stage had been set by
these demands. A similar problem occurred at Northwest. Even
though a broad range of constituents from both sides attended the
first day of training, they did not understand the distinction
between interests and positions. As a result, the list of
"interests" presented by the union to management were seen as
inappropriate by management negotiators, and, an indication of
the union's inability to do mutual-gains bargaining.
Constituents also resisted mutual-gains bargaining because
it generated innovative options that they had not foreseen or
approved. Once bargainers understood brainstorming, they became
excited about the process and generated new ideas. Inevitably
they found themselves too far ahead of their constituents. They
discussed ideas that were not "approved" by constituents and,
when word got out that new, "dangerous" proposals were being
negotiated, constituent monitoring intensified. At Northwest,
the lead union bargainer faced an angry constituent-advisory
group member, who complained that the advisory group was not
needed if the primary team could launch into new areas without
their approval. On the management side, the president and other
members of the senior management team often rejected new ideas.
Similarly, at Southwest, when top managers and union leaders
heard that some temporary agreements were being reached in
subcommittee meetings, they quickly rejected the agreements.
In mutual-gains bargaining, negotiators are caught between
29
constituent expectations that they will be kept informed on every
aspect of negotiations, and the need for open, innovative
discussions. Constituents could be informed of every new idea,
but this would greatly restrict the brainstorming phase and tie
negotiators up in constant meetings with constituents. Yet if
negotiators eventually bring back ideas to constituents that are
too radical or too difficult to understand without bringing them
along gradually, the new ideas will not be accepted. And since
radically new ideas are apt to be generated in mutual-gains
bargaining, constituent management problems are heightened
considerably. Moreover, these problem are likely to accumulate
as the midpoint of negotiations approaches, so constituent
pressures may push the midpoint switching process in the
direction of traditional bargaining.
In mutual-gains bargaining, some basic tenets of traditional
constituent management are violated: the primary teams become an
integrated team, raising constituent suspicion; radical rather
than incremental changes are discussed; and information flows
freely, to constituents as well as to opponents, so that it is
more difficult to manage constituent impressions of the content
and process of negotiations. In traditional bargaining the
negotiating group has a process for managing its relationships
across boundaries. Those who use mutual-gains bargaining will





Theory in mutual-gains bargaining generally presumes that
negotiators act as unitary actors. Group dynamics is a
relatively understudied and undertheorized dimension of
negotiation. As a result, the prescriptive advice that comes
from theory and practice tends to focus on the individual levels.
Based on this exploration of group process, it is possible to
supplement existing normative theory with recommendations aimed
at the group level. Many of these recommendations presume either
that an outside interventionist is present, or that an insider
takes the lead in introducing changes.
Assistance in Getting Started.
Getting started requires attention to individual members'
concerns about their position, authority, and acceptance. These
concerns are likely to be most pronounced among leaders and
others who will perceive that mutual-gains bargaining erodes
their power and influence. Assistance in getting started must
ensure the development of norms that support mutual-gains
bargaining, not traditional models.
It is clear that the individual concerns of members
regarding identity, acceptance, and authority need to be
addressed if the primary and integrated groups are to function
effectively. Members need to get to know each other, to test one
another, and to find their place in the group process. Until
they do so, they will be unlikely to map out a reasonable
approach to negotiations, create a realistic agenda, or share the
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kinds of information required for mutual-gains bargaining.
These concerns can be addressed in a variety of ways. Any
occasion that provide opportunities for members to interact and
get to know each other will ease some of the concerns and
anxieties experienced in the early stages. Preliminary meetings
held to plan upcoming negotiations or to share information also
give members an opportunity to test and get to know each other.
For example, in a new labor-management relationship, Harvard
University administration and Harvard support staff allocated 60
days to meet, exchange information about the university and the
union, and get to know each other before they went into formal
bargaining. Training that precedes mutual-gains bargaining can
have the same effect, especially if participants have sufficient
time to process both the skills and the experience.
While formal meetings are important, some of these issues
can be worked out in informal get-togethers away from the
immediate demands of the moment. Dinners, drinks, and volleyball
games give people an opportunity to step out of role and get to
know each other on a more personal basis (Friedman and Gal, 1989;
Kolb and Coolidge, 1988). Indeed, meeting away from the table is
an oft mentioned characteristic of negotiations in other
cultures.
There are people whose roles and positions will always
change dramatically when negotiations shift to a mutual gains
approach. In collective bargaining, these are the chief
negotiators for both management and labor. Under traditional
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methods, they exert considerable control and authority, which
must change if the more participative mutual-gains model is to be
implemented. Thus, any intervention must include some attention
to the leadership. First, it is important to recognize these
stakeholders as the ones most likely to be resistant. Second,
any intervention must include some separate time with leaders so
that their special concerns can be addressed. Generally, any
discussions of this sort should be handled in private, over
drinks or dinner, so that the leader is not embarrassed or
humiliated in front of the group. Observations about their
behavior, the subtle ways in which they may be undercutting the
process, can be discussed in a casual way. Indeed, what we know
about successful change efforts suggests that unless the leader
is solidly on board, significant change is unlikely to result.
Thus, these meetings become a test of commitment. It is
important to realize, however, that special attention to leaders
may reinforce their position rather than assisting them to give
up some control and authority.
Norms form and solidify early in a group's life. Groups new
to mutual-gains bargaining need to attend to the norm development
process and be on the lookout for existing scripts that threaten
to drive out new behaviors. This is as important a part of
training as learning the actual skills themselves. Indeed, a key
norm to develop is to confront explicitly traditional ways of
doing things when they creep in. There are several ways that
this can be accomplished. First, traditional and mutual-gains
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approaches can be formally debated by having people act as
devil's advocates for the old approach (Mitroff and Mason, 1981).
Or the group can agree to comment when people are not behaving
according to the mutual-gains model. Thus, like the groups at
Northwest, they can humorously label traditional behaviors as
"wrong." Generally doing things in new ways can break up old
patterns. These new things might include sitting in different
positions, exchanging roles in simulations, and trying exercises
that loosen up existing scripts (such as creativity generating
games). All of these are attempts by the group to break down
barriers that impede the development of norms that support
mutual-gains bargaining.
Assistance at the Midpoint.
The negotiations midpoint presents both special challenges
and special opportunities for mutual gains bargaining
negotiators. In order to continue mutual-gains bargaining past
the midpoint, it is necessary to anticipate the changes that will
occur. It is discouraging, even to the most committed
negotiators, to discover that they are far from agreement despite
their best efforts, and to begin to wonder if this new process
actually works.
Negotiators need to be reassured that the transition they
face is a natural one. It does not indicate that their efforts
up to the midpoint were for naught. An apt analogy is to a
building that is under construction. One can go by the building
lot for months and months and see no visible progress. It
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appears that nothing is getting done. Then suddenly the building
frame goes up in a few days and it seems like a miraculous
accomplishment. Yet the frame could not have been put up so
quickly and easily if months had not been spent putting in a
foundation under ground. After the frame goes up progress slows
again as the work changes to that of putting up walls and
interiors. Because the initial period of this process can be so
frustrating, support and intervention can be very helpful.
Midpoint intervention can include analysis, brainstorming,
renegotiating how to negotiate and restructuring. As a first
step, negotiators should be encouraged to look at what they have
accomplished, what is left to accomplish, and what changes in the
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bargaining process are needed to complete negotiations.
Negotiators can use the very process they applied in the first
half of negotiations, that is, they can brainstorm about ways to
proceed that are neither the traditional ones nor the ones used
during the inventing stage.
Thinking in terms of opposites can facilitate brainstorming:
if groups worked in subcommittee before, maybe working at the
main table would be better now; if they focused on internal
process before, maybe they should focus on external relations
now. Once they have analyzed what needs to be accomplished and
developed new ideas for approaching those needs, the groups will
have to renegotiate the structure and process that they will use
in the final stages of bargaining.
The midpoint can be a time when the group feels overwhelmed.
Although it may appear counterproductive, this may be the time
for the group to take some time out from their work. Sessions
where the group can vent its frustration or where additional
training occurs enable the group to deal explicitly with its
midpoint issues. The group may be resistant to taking time when
they already feel short of time. However, directly confronting
some of these issues may enable the group to deal less
emotionally with the time problem. It may be appropriate for the
consultant to assist in running these kinds of sessions.
The midpoint is also an opportune time to restructure the
group. This can include a change of personnel or a change in the
patterns of group work. For example, this could be a time to
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bring in a constituent or someone with a particular expertise
that the group now needs. Similarly a group that was meeting two
times a week for two hours may now need to meet more often or for
a longer duration.
Vigilance is particularly important at the midpoint.
Negotiators need to keep a sharp eye on behavior, as old habits
and safe, traditional routines can easily reemerge under the
increased pressures of the second half of negotiations. At the
same time, it is also important for the groups to commend
themselves. They need to celebrate the progress that they have
made thus far and use that as a basis for continuing to the final
stages.
Assistance in Managing Internal/External Relationships.
Balancing internal and external demands is among the most
difficult tasks facing the team engaged in mutual-gains
bargaining. Whatever strategy is chosen involves tradeoffs
between internal cohesion and external acceptance, between
creating an innovative product and seeing that product
implemented. Several interventions can facilitate this delicate
balancing act. These include training external constituents more
thoroughly, encouraging explicit probing activity, making
brainstorming an intergroup rather than an intragroup activity,
and obtaining sponsorship from the beginning.
External constituents often feel like second-class citizens
when mutual-gains bargaining is introduced. The prospects for
better support may lie in the ways constituents are treated
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during the early stages. Training these "outsiders" in the
elements of mutual gains bargaining is a start, but it is not
enough External constituents need to be prepared for the new
roles that they will play over the course of the negotiating
process. They will be called upon to provide information,
suggestions, feedback, and support throughout the negotiations.
They will be asked to comment on only partially formed ideas,
ideas that may be very different from those formulated in
traditional bargaining. Consultants and members of the primary
group need to forewarn constituents that their ideas may seem
bazaar or useless but that these ideas may improve given
additional time and thought. Thus, constituencies need to be
trained to become an effective part of the process.
A probing strategy promises to be the most effective at
balancing internal/external relationships in mutual-gains
bargaining. Therefore teams, as part of their training, need to
be instructed about the elements of a probing strategy. First,
team members need to face up to the political realities of change
in organizational life. Any new endeavor will have its allies
and blockers. Teams need to map the pockets of support and
resistance and find the opinion leaders who can bring constituent
groups along. Once supporters are identified, they must be
cultivated and given information that will encourage them to
convince others of the chosen options. Likewise, resisters need
to be contained and defused. Perhaps they can be given
inducements to support the negotiated settlement, or at least to
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keep silent so that they do not mobilize a blocking coalition.
This political aspect of probing requires proactive behavior. It
is not enough for the team to deal with management and labor
representatives who happen to show up at meetings. Rather,
opinion leaders must be identified and then these people must be
cultivated. The integrated team, with or without the aid of the
facilitator, needs to carry out this probing activity.
A second aspect of probing is testing, in which the team
tests its ideas out on various constituent groups. Questions
such as, "If we did this, what would your reaction be?" and "Does
this satisfy your need for an easy to implement compensation
package?" are examples of testing procedures. Testing should be
an ongoing process; it should also be started early, before
blocking groups have an opportunity to mobilize against an
option. Many teams generate excellent ideas only to be
criticized or even disowned by constituent groups when those
ideas are presented. Those external groups need to get used to
the new ideas and to feel as if they had a part in shaping them.
In the short term, testing may demotivate the team, as many of
their ideas may be derided or actually vetoed. To avoid
constituent testing, however, is to pay a high price later in the
negotiations.
Inventing options through brainstorming is typically seen as
a task that occupies the integrated group or subcommittees of its
members. For probing teams, however, brainstorming becomes an
activity for both the integrated and the constituent groups.
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Both sets of groups can produce, criticize, and evaluate ideas
and options. It is a well-known phenomenon that ideas are more
easily accepted when people feel that they have participated in
their production. Therefore, bringing a wider range of
stakeholders into the brainstorming process increases the
probability that those ideas will eventually be implemented.
Again, there are costs to this strategy. It takes time to
contact outsiders, and the group may have more ideas than it can
handle already. Further, the group may feel pressured to accept
the external input it solicited. Nonetheless, this may be a
small price to pay for acceptance of the settlement in the final
stages.
Finally, it should be clear that managing all these external
activities will be much easier if there is clear, public support
from a well-placed sponsor at the outset. Support from the top
of the labor and management organizations provides legitimacy for
the integrated group. With blessings from on high, it becomes
easier to garner additional backing from other stakeholders.
Generally, probing is facilitated when the teams do not have to
fight to schedule meetings, and when an influential sponsor has
already done some of the marketing. The probability of success
is improved enormously when the project begins with top-level
support and when that support is given in both public and private
domains.
This article has focused the group research lens on the
process of mutual gains bargaining. Key points from this group
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perspective include the importance of managing the beginning of a
group's life, its midpoint, and its external relationships. This
analysis has resulted in a set of techniques or improving mutual
gains bargaining. While the analysis used the labor-management
setting to illustrate major ideas, the concepts developed and the
recommendations offered have implications for negotiations
conducted in other settings as well. Clearly, negotiating with a
MGB approach poses potential pitfalls, but some of these may be
avoided if group dynamics are managed effectively.
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